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IN THE SUPRE~E COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------------------
JULIAN BARLOW, CHARLES 
CLEGG, and DIXIE CLEGG, 
Plaintiffs and Resoondants, 
vs. Case No. 15609 
CH.'\RI.ES KEENER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATE~ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by a landlord for unlawful 
detainer against a tenant upon the basis of non-payment of 
rent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was never tried. Prom a judgment enter-
ing the default of Defendant, and awarding damages and 
costs to Plaintiffs, Defendant anoeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE~L 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and 
remand of the case for trial, with instructions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleoed a landlord/tenant 
r0lationship between the oarties, and souoht relief based 
-1-
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upon Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute, Utah Corle §78-36-1 
et. seq. (1953 as amended). The grounds alleqed are non-
payment of rent. Defendant's Amended Answer alleoes four 
defenses. The one of particular concern to this aPDeal is 
the Fourth Defense, that being a breach by the landlord 
of the warranty of habitability implied in the rental 
agreement between the parties. 
The matter was set for a Pre-Trial Settlement 
Conference on November 21, 1977, pursuant to an order of 
Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. His order required the 
attendance of the parties and their counsel, and sneci ficaL 
noted that motions for summary judgment would not be heard 
at the hearing. Apoellant was unable to attend said heari": 
because he could not be located by his attorney, who had 
lost contact with him. This was known to opposing counsel 
more than six months prior to said hearinq. 
At the Pre-Trial Settlement Conference, counsel 
for the tenant/defendant/appellant explained to the court 
the absence of his client. However, counsel stated that~ 
was prepared to proceed to trial, in that evidence and 
testimony was available even in the absence of his client 
to substantiate the Fourth Defense in Defendant's Answer. 
The Judge refused to recognize warranty of habitabilitv 
as a defense to an action for u~lawful detainer. Instead, 
the Court entered the default of Defendant and granted 
Plaintiffs judgment as prayed in his Complaint, over thP 
objection of defense counsel. 
A motion for relief from judgment was tirm·l·; 
filed. Following arqument, at which time neither Pld 1 n1 1 · 
-2- .. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nor their attorney apoeared, Judge David B. Dee denied 
sJicJ motion. The matter now comes before this Court for 
determination of whether a warranty of habitability is 
implied in a rental agreement, the breach thereof consti-
tutinq a defense to an unlawful detainer action, and whether 
a Defendant has a right to a trial in his absence when his 
attorney is authorized and nrepared to proceed to trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. A WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
IS IMPLIED IN EVERY RESIDENTIAL 
AGREEMENT, AND THE BREACH 
THEREOF CONSTITUTES A DEFENSE 
TO AN EVICTION ACTION BASED 
UPON NON-PAYMENT OF RENT. 
The concept of a warranty of habitability 
contains three elements. The first is that the warranty 
e~ists by implication in all residential landlord/tenant 
agreements to the effect that the premises are fit for its 
intended use, human occupancy. The second element is that 
the warranty is mutually dependant upon the tenant's 
covenant to pay rent. The third is that the breach of the 
warranty by the landlord justifies the tenant in suspending 
the payment of rent. In turn, the breach of the warranty 
is a defense to an action by a landlord under Utah's 
Cnlawful Detainer Statute, and forms the basis for a court 
order compelling a landlord to ~ender the premises habitable. 
The court can also determine the rental value of the premises 
in an uninhabitable condition, if any, and require a tenant 
to pay a reduced amount of rent for such a period. 
The existence of a warranty of habitability 
rives historically from combining principles of orooerty, 
-3-
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contract and tort law, as developed below. It urevails 
in a substantial maiority of jurisdictions in this countr~ 
today. 
A. EVERY RESIDENTIAL RENTAL AGREEMENT IS BOTH 
A CONVEYANCE AND A CONTRACT. MODERN 
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND THE REMEDIES 
PROPOUNDED THEREUNDER ARE FULLY 
APPLICABLE TO THE AREA OF LANDLORD-TENANT 
LAW AND SHOULD BE APPLIED INSTEAD 
OF TRADITIONAL PROPERTY LAW WHICH 
NO LONGER RELATES TO TODAY'S 
RENTAL TRANSACTIONS AND URBAN 
REALITII:S. 
At common law, leaseholds and landlord-tenant 
law were governed by traditional property law orincioles. 
leasehold was treated as a conveyance of an interest in 
land, carrying with it the doctrine of caveat emptor; 
40 ALR3d 649. The lessor merely covenanted that he had the 
legal right to transfer possession and that he would 
assure the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the leasehold. 
The lessor had no obligation to repair nor did he imoliedlv 
warrant the habitability of the premises or their fitness 
for any particular purposes; 49 AmJur2d, Landlord and Tena~ 
These common law property precepts originated in 
feudal England, a largely agrarian, non-industrial society 
where the tillable land itself was oenerally the basis of 
bargain. The concept that the lessor was not obliqated 
to repair was settled law by 1485; Javins v. First Nat1on 3 : 
Realty Corporation, 138 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 428 F.2d 
1071 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 186, 
27 L.Ed. 2d 185 (1970), at 1077. T~ese principles also 
developed before the concept of mutually dencndant 
covenants; 6 Williston Contracts, §890 (1d ed. 1962) · 
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The prospective tenant was expected to insoect the property 
and any structures thereon prior to the conveyance. 
Since his primary interest was in the tillable land itself, 
any buildings thereon were merely incidental. The early 
lessee's living quarters were simple structures containing 
none of the sophisticated conveniences and utilities we 
commonly associate with today's residential dwellino unit. 
Almost any problem that could arise regarding the dwelling 
could easily be handled by the lessee. Today, the situation 
is much different, as expressed in Javins, suora: 
Today's urban tenants, the vast majority 
of whom live in multiple dwelling houses, 
are interested, not in the land, but 
solely in "a house suitable for occupation." 
Furthermore, today's city dweller usually 
has a single, specialized skill unrelated 
to maintenance work; he is unable to 
make repairs like to "jack-of-all-trades" 
farmer who was the common law's model 
of the lessee. Further, unlike his 
agrarian predecessor who often remained 
on one piece of land for his entire 
life, urban tenants today are more mobile 
than ever before. A tenant's tenure in 
a specific apartment will often not be 
sufficient to justify efforts at repairs. 
In addition, the increasing complexity 
of today's dwellings renders them much 
more difficult to reoair than the struc-
tures of earlier tim~s. In a multiple 
dwelling repair may require access to 
equipment and areas in the control of 
the landlord. Low and middle income 
tenants, even if they were interested 
in maklng repairs, would be unable to 
obtain any financing for major repairs 
since they have no long-term interest 
in thE property. Id, at 1Q7q (Emphasis 
added). 
Because leaseholds originated as conveyances of 
r, al property interests, the law governing leaseholds has 
l·•cloped to control all leases as if they were concerned 
only with an interest in land. This has remained the governing 
-5-
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common law even though today very few lessees arc interestc_ 
in the land, but rather, contract for the use of the dwelli-
space. 
When American city dwellers, both rich 
and poor, seek "shelter" to:lay, they seek 
a well known packaae of qoods and 
services - a package which includes 
not merely walls and ceilings, but also 
adequate heat, liqht and ventilation, 
serviceable plumbina facilities, 
secure windows and doors, proper 
sanitation, and proper maintenance. Id, 
at 1074 (Emphasis added). 
In reality, today's tenant has entered into a 
consumer contract for the use of the dwellinq upon the la~. 
The modern tenant generally considers the lease in terms 
of contract law, as to his or her expectations. 
Many jurisdictions in this country are realizina 
that the old rules of property law governing leases are 
inappropriate to apply to modern lease transactions. 
They have recognized, as urqed by the leqal scholars, 
that the essential nature of today's lease is contractual 
and that contract principles provide a much more rational 
framework for the apportionment of landlord-tenant res-
ponsibilities than at common law; see Lesar, The Landlord-
Tenant Relation in Prospective; and 1 S. Williston, A 
Treatise on the Law of Contracts §890, at 580-581, ( 3d 
ed. 1962). 
The Hawaii Supreme Court, in a very well reason~ 
decision, Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969), 
totally rejected caveat emotor as a valid princiole in 
modern lease law and a~olied contract princioles to r~~~~ 
its decision. It held as follows: 
-6-
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(A] lease is, in essence, a sale as well 
as a transfer of an estate in land and is, 
more importantly, a contractual relation-
ship. Id, at 474. 
The Court drew this conclusion from its reasonina that: 
The rule of Caveat Emotor in lease 
transactions at one time may have had 
some basis in social practice as well 
as in historical doctrine. At common 
law leases were customarily lengthy 
documents embodying the full expecta-
tions of the parties. There was generally 
equal knowledge of the condition of the 
land by both the landlord and tenant. 
The land itself would often yield the 
rents and the buildings were constructed 
simply, without modern conveniences 
like wiring or plumbing. Yet, in an 
urban society where the vast majority 
of tenants do not reap the rent directly 
from the land but bargain primarily 
for the right to enjoy the premises 
for living purposes . . common 
law conceptions of a lease and the tenant's 
liability for rent are no longer viable. 
Id, at 472. 
The Court in Lemle, drew support for its constructional lease 
for a dwelling unit from several impressive authorities. 1 
Despite its common law origins, the modern lease 
is a contract which should be viewed in law with the same 
regard as consumer contracts in sales and other areas. 
It must be recognized that a habitable ~welling unit is the 
essence of today's lease and that the obligations which 
arise from the nature of the transaction must be applied 
as in a contract. 
1 
B. ;JEASE TRANSl\CTIONS ARE A CONTRACTUAL 
~ELATIONSHIP FROM WHICH AN IMPLIBD 
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY A~D FITNESS 
Skillern, "Imolied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change", 
~4 Denver L. J. 387 (1Q67); Schoshinski, "Remedies of the Indigent 
l n3nt:-----Proposal for Change", 54 Geo. L. J. 519 (1966); note 
": '1,• Indigent Tenant and the Doctrine of Constructive Eviction", 
i. '.;11. u.L.Q., 461 (1968); and Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 
-.J \l.,J. 444, 452 A.2d 268 (1969). 
-7-
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FOR THE PURPOSE INTENDED IS A 
NECESSARY IMPLICATION. 
An early decision adoptina this position was p 1 ~.,_: 
v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 14 Wis.2d 590, (1961). Re coo-
nizinq the basis incompatibility between the common law 
and modern housing and health regulations, the Court abolii 
caveat emptor and established an implied warranty of habit-
ability as a means of enforcing Wisconsin's heal th and b1E'.-_ 
codes. 
To follow the old rule of no implied 
warranty of habitability in leases would, 
in our opinion, be inconsistent with 
the current legislative policy concerning 
housing standards. The need and social 
desirability of adequate housing for 
people in this era of rapid population 
increases is too important to be rebuffed 
by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat 
emptor. Permitting landlords to rent 
"tumbledown" houses is at least a 
contributing cause of such problems 
as urban blight, juvenile delinquency 
and high property taxes for conscientious 
landowners. Id, at 412-3 (Emphasis added). 
Several other jurisdictions have found Pines 
persuasive. In Reste Realty Corporation v. Cooper, 251 
A.2d 268, New Jersey (1969), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
established an implied warranty that the "premises are 
suitable for the leased purposes and conform to local code 0 
and zoning laws"; Id, at 272. The Court assailed the co~=· 
law "no repair" rule as incompatible with modern times. 
The court also stressed the lawnord' s superior bargaininc 
powei and knowledge of defects and his ability to remeJ~ 
them. In the more recent cases of Foisy v. Wy!'1an, 515 
P.2d 160, (Wash. 1973); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2·1 ln-l. 
(Kan. 197'1); Brown v. Robyn Realty Comoanv, 367 A.2d l~'. 
-8- d 
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('Jc_'l., 1976\; Brown v. Sonth:ill Rcaltv Co., 217 A.2'1 834, 
1D.C. Ct. of .~op. 1968); ,Javins, supra, ani Marini v. 
Irdan_c:!, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970); the courts 
have all taken the Pines position that the municioal health 
ancl building codes by necessity require that a warranty of 
habitability be implied in all residential lease aareements. 
It has come to be recognized that ordinarily 
the lessee does not have as much knowledge 
of the condition of the premises as the 
lessor. Building code requirements 
and violations are known or made known 
to the lessor, not the lessee. He is 
in a better position to know of latent 
defects, structural and otherwise, 
in a building which might go unnoticed 
by a lessee who rarely has sufficient 
knowledge or expertise to see or to 
discover them. A prospective lessee . 
cannot be expected to know if the plumbing 
or wiring systems are adequate or conform 
to local codes. Nor should he be 
expected to hire experts to advise 
him. Ordinarily, all this information 
should be considered readily available 
to the lessor who in turn can inform 
the prospective lessee. These factors 
have produced persuasive arguments for 
re-evaluation of the caveat emptor 
doctrine and, for imposition of an 
implied warranty that the premises 
are suitable for the leased purposes 
and conform to local codes and zonina 
laws. Id, at 272. (Reste) 
In another landmark case establishing the implied 
warranty of habitability, Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 
(Iowa ]·972), the court emphasized the inequality of baraaining 
positions. 
The trend of modern decisions adoctinq 
an implied warranty concept is grounded, 
in part, on a felt need to re-assess the 
real as ooposed to theoretical meaning 
of a lease: 
'There is clearly discernible tendency 
on the part of the courts to cast 
aside the technicalities in the inter-
pretation of leases and to concentrate 
-9-
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their attention, as in the case of 
other contracts, on the intention of 
the parties . 6 Williston on Con-
tracts, Sect. 890 A, po. 592-93 
(3d ed. 1962). 
In addition cases [have] recoanized 
landlord's suoerior position to know of 
housing law violations ani to discover 
deficiencies in the Premises to be 
leased. The frequent inequality in 
bargaining power was acknowledged; 
where housing is in short supply the 
potential lessee is in no position to 
dicker about even the most basic nec-
essities. Id, at 794. 
It is clear that the court recognized that a modern lease 
is in reality a consumer contract entered into by parties 
in unequal bargaining positions. (See also, Javins, suora) 
The Javins, supra, decision is most illustrative 
of the unequal bargaining position between a landlord and 
tenant and the concept of caveat lessee. The court analoqi:' 
the recent development of warranty doctrines in consumer 
and tort law to modern lease transactions and noted the ab~· 
of compelling reasons why these doctrines should not be 
applied to landlord-tenant law. Id, at 1079. 
examined the position of today's urban tanant: 
The inequality in baraaining power 
between landlord and tenant has been 
The Court 
well documented. Tenants have very 
little leverage to enforce demands for 
better housing. Various impediments 
to competition in the rental housing 
market, such as racial and class dis-
crimination and standardized form 
leases, mean that landlords place 
tenants in a take it or leave it 
situation. The increasingly severe 
shortage of adequate housing further 
increases the landlord's barqainina 
power and escalates the need for main-
taining and improvinq the existing stock. 
Finally, the findings by various studies 
of the social impact of bad housing 
has led to the realization that ooor 
-10-
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housing is detrimental to the whole 
society, not merely to the unluckv ones 
who must suffer the daily indignity of 
living in a slum. Id, at (footnotes 
omitted, emphasis added). 
Other recent and significant cases have stressed 
the virtual impossibility of a tenant conducting an adequate 
insoection of modern apartments. In Lemle, suora, 
the Hawaii Supreme Court analogized the warranty of fitness 
and merchantability implied in the sale of qoods to the 
leasing of real property. The court concluded that an 
implied warranty of habitability and fitness for the purposes 
intended in the lease of a dwelling house, was a "just 
and necessary implication." Id, at 474. These cases have 
held that public policy compels that lanjlord to bear 
primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and 
habitable housing, since this was the very essence of what 
the tenant bargained for; see Green v. The Superior Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco, 517 P.2d 1168, 
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, (1974) and Marini v. Ireland, 265 
A.2d 526, (New Jersey, 1970). 
[I)t is eminently fair and just to 
charge a landlord with the duty or 
warrantying that a building or part 
thereof rented for residential ourposes 
is fit for that purpose at the inception 
of the term and will remain so during 
the enti~e term. Id, at 529. 
Approximately 35 jurisdictions in this country have express-
ly or impliedly embraced the implied warranty of habitability.
2 
2Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra; Green v. 
Su1wrior court of City and County of San Francisco, suora; 
lltll v. Municipal court, 10 Cal.3d 641, 111 Cal. Rptr. 721, 
~-l,-P.2d ll85 (1974); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App.3d 62, 
··unt.) 
-ll-
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A good overall review of significant cases from 
various jurisdictions, which have upheld the warranties of 
habitability and fitness for intended use can be found at 
40 ALR 3d 653. Overwhelmingly, the modern tren'1 of the cao: 
law supports the existence of an implied warranty of 
habitability in residential rental aqreements. 
<
2 
cont.) 
C. THE TENANT'S DUTY TO PAY RENT IS 
DEPENDENT UPON THE LANDLORD'S 
102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 
367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 
73 Misc.2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1973); Amanuensis Ltd. 
v. Brown, 65 Misc.2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1971); Lemle v. 
Breeden, supra; Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 
482 (1969); Boston Housing Authority v. Heminqway, 361 
Mass. 184 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W. 
2d 65 (Mo.Ct. App. 1973); Sarqent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 
308 A.2d 528 (1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 
248 (1971); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J.Super. 
577, 338 A.2d 21 (1975); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, Jr 
A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, supra; Academy Spires, Ir. 
v. Brown, 111 N.J.Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Reste 
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); 
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 205 
(1972); Mease v. Fox, Iowa, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Glyco v. 
Schultz, Ohio Mun.Ct., 62 Ohio Op.2d 227, 289 N.E.2d 919 
(1972); Presson v. Mountain States Properties, Inc., 18 .l\ri: 
App. 176, 501 P.2d 17 (1972); Tucker v. Crawford, Del.Su~r. 
315 A.2d 737 (1974); Gable v. Silver, 258 So.2d 11 (Fla.ADD 
1972); Quesenbury v. Patrick, CCH Poverty, L.Rep. ~15,803 
(El Paso County Court., Colo. 1972); Givens v. Gray, CCH Po· 
L.Rep. 1115,412 (Ga.App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Monumental 
Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974); Foisv 
v. Wyman, supra; Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 52-l~­
P. 2d 304 (1974); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 
N.W.2d 339 (1973); Brown v. Robyn Realty Co., Del.Super., 
367 A.2d 183 (1976); Evans v. Does, La.App., 283 So.2d 
804 (1973); Old Town Development Co. v. Lanqford, Ind. Ct. 
App., 349 N.E.2d 744 (19761; Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 
supra; Quevedo v. Braga, Super., 140 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1977): 
Kintner v. Harr, 408 P.2d 487, 146 ~ont. 461 (1965) - R.C.'! 
1947 §42-201; Jarrell v. Hartman, 6 Ill. Dec. 812, 363 
N.E.2d 626 (1977); South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombrioht, 
5 Ill. Dec. 472, 361 N.E.2d 795 (1977); Pines, supra. 
-12-
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PERFOR'1ANCE OF HIS IMPLIED WARRANTY 
OF HABITABILITY AND FITNESS FOR THE 
PURPOSE INTENDE8 ~ND THE LANDLORD'S 
BREACH OF THESE WARRANTIES MAY BE 
RAISED AS A DEFENSE TO AN UNLAWFUL 
DETAINER ACTION BASED ON NON-P~YMENT 
OF RENT. 
In the substantial majority of the previously 
cited cases, the courts have held that the relationship of 
the landlord and his tenant is a contractual one, with the 
covenant to pay rent mutually dependent upon the landlord's 
covenant to maintain a habitable dwelling. 
The significance of this new framework for appor-
tionment of landlord-tenant responsibilities and establishing 
dependent covenants is that all the remedies for breach of 
contract are available to the tenant. The failure of the 
landlord to supply a habitable rental unit amounts to a 
failure of consideration thereby breaching the contract, 
and justifying rent abatement. 
Logically then, the tenant whose landlord fails 
to maintain the premises in a habitable condition should be 
able to rescind the contract by abandoning the premises 
(constructive eviction) without incurring liability for 
rent, as in Reste, deduct the costs necessary to make the 
dwelling habitable (repair and deduct) under Marini; 
bring an action for damages (retroactive rent abatement) 
to be measured by the difference in value as between what 
the ~easonable rental value is of the uninhabitable dwelling 
and the contractual rental rate, as in Marini, Barzito, 
Qu~vc=do, and Jarrell; bring an action for specific performance 
rn r·ompc=l the landlord to provide that which was bargained 
f~r; or entitle the tenant to rent abatement by withhold-
-13-
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ing rent and raising the landlord's breach in defense to a~ 
action for summary dispossession, as in Academy Spires. 
In Utah, the only remedies available to the tena~: 
have been constructive eviction and housing code enforcemei:: 
by State or municipal building inspectors. But these 
remedies are inadequate and impractical for several reasons. 
The constructive eviction defense is an impractic: 
remedy in that it requires the tenant to vacate the premise; 
This is a very burdensome requirement especially in today's 
housing market. The vacancy rate overall is higher than 
that for the segment of our population of low income persons 
those most often subjected to uninhabitable conditions. 
Compounding this problem is the lack of habitable housing 
in the Wasatch front markets. The most recent survey indic,· 
that there is an immediate need of repair or replacement of 
24,321 units in Salt Lake City which is 17 percent of all 
housing units for that city alone. 3 The same study indicat: 
there are 12,953 low income renters in the Salt Lake City 
vying for the limited low-oriced rental units available. 
Therefore, the tenant would most likely find himself in an 
equally delapidated dwelling upon moving. Constructive 
eviction is also an inadequate remedy in that the tenant 
must be able to prove the rental unit was indeed uninhabitat 
This defense would be unnecessary where an implied warrant 
of habitability exists. 
3
statistical Analysis of Utah Housing Conditions and Needs 
(1977), prepared by the Housing Development Division oepar:-
ment of Community Affairs, State of Utah. 
-14-
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Housing Code enforcement is far from effective as 
L11e Javins, supra, noted. The ineffectiveness of this method 
stems from the cour~s unwillingness to recognize housing 
violations as crimes and impose fines, and when they do, 
they are often minimal and simply treated as a cost of 
doing business. 66 Columbia LR. 1254, 1279 (1966). 
And if the inspection results in a condemnation, the tenant 
is again subjected to the problem of finding another adequate 
and affordable dwelling. A presidential commission reported 
that inadequate enforcement has led to 
. thousands of landlords in dis-
advantaged neighborhoods openly violating 
building codes with impunity, thereby 
providing a constant demonstration of 
flagrant discrimination by legal auth-
orities . [I]n most cities, few 
building code violations are corrected, 
even when tenants complain directly to 
municipal building departments . 
[T]he open violation of codes [acts] 
as a constant source of distress to 
low-income tenants and creates serious 
hazards to health and safety in disad-
vantaged neighborhoods." Report of the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, 472 (Bantam ed., 1968). 
The warranty of habitability defense goes to 
the very essence of the dispute in an action for unlawful 
detainer for non-payment of rent. If the warranty is sub-
stantially breached, the tenant's obligation is reduced. 
When demand is made, the amount of the demand is inaccurate 
and ~n excess of the tenant's obligation. The lack of effect-
ive ~emedies for the tenant has no doubt led to the current 
situation of large numbers of dilapidated dwellings and 
units in substantial violation of the housing codes. For 
these reasons, it is urged that this court recognize breach 
-15-
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of the warranty of habitability as a .jcf,•ns•· to an 1mla·~:· 
detainer action based on non-payment of rent. 
D. SOUND PUBLIC POLICY DICTATE THE 
CREATION OF .II. 1-iARRA'.'lTY OF HABITABIL-
ITY. 
In assessing the competing interests between 
landlords and tenants, an equitable balance weighs heavil· 
in favor of the tenant for the establishment of a warrant; 
of habitability. Support can be found in legislative poll: 
and decisions creating housing and health codes. When 
comparing the foregoing legal arguments with the equities 
presented in the lanJlord-tenant relationship, the tenant 
should be favored in that his reasonable exoectations have 
not been met when a landlord violates such a housing or 
health code. The courts and states' legislatures have lone 
been aware of the fact that inadequate and substandard 
housing has an overwhelmingly negative effect on the in-
dividuals who are unfortunate enough to live in it and on 
society in general; see, Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 
(D.C. Cir. 1968), at 701, and Cf. Brown v. Boan'! of Educat:: 
of Topeka, 344 U.S. 1, 345 U.S. 972, 347 U.S. 483, 98 
Led 873, 74S.Ct. 686, 38 ALR.2r1 ll80 (1954). 
"Miserable and disreputable housing con-
ditions may do more than soread disease 
and crime and immorality. They may also 
suffocate the spirit by redccinq the 
people who live there to the status of 
cattle. They may indeed make living an 
almost insufferable burden. They may 
also be an ugly sore, a blight on the 
community which robs it of charm, which 
makes it a place from housina may despoil 
a community as an or:ien se1ver may ruin 
a river." Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32-33, 75 S.Ct. 98 102, 99 
L.Ed. 27 (1954). See also Frank v. 
-lC-
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State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371, 
79 S.Ct. R04, Rll, 3 L.Ed.2d 877. 
(1969): "The need to maintain basic, 
minimal standards of housinq, to prevent 
the spread of disease and of that.per-
vasive break-down in the fiber of a people 
which is nroduced by slums and the ab-
sence of the barest essentials of civ-
ilized livinq, has mounted to a ma1or 
concern of American government." Edwards, 
supra, at 701. 
Such harm is recoonized by legislators or govern-
ment entities desiring and requiring the maintenance of 
housing and health codes. This is based upon the realiza-
tion that urban blight results from the non-enforcement 
of the landlord's duty to repair. Uninhabitable conditions 
are a contributing cause of juvenile delinquency, crime, 
and other social problems. It can also cause damages or 
increase costs to nearby conscientious landowners. 
Whether established judicially or by a leqislature, 
the determination has been made throughout our country that 
it is desirable to impose duties on a property owner to 
maintain habitable conditions. Otherwise, enforcement of 
the health and building codes would be frustrated. The 
tenant simply is not in a position to perform substantial 
repairs and maintenance, nor should he be required to do so. 
A landlord's interests merit consideration. The 
major argument raised is that forcing the landlord to strict 
compliance with the housing code, and/or allowinq rent abate-
ment, will place him out of business and take more units 
off the market. However, this argument finds little support; 
see Ackerman, Requlatinq Slum Housinq Markets on Behalf 
of the Poor: Of Housinq Codes Housinq Subsidies and 
I', ,.,,r<ie Redistribution Policv, 80 Yale L.J. 1093, 1997 (1971) · 
-17-
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Also, the landlords who are faced with this problem are in 
substantial violation of state and local housing codes 
and are therefore guilty of criminal activity. For the COU'. 
to cater to their demands would be a travesty of justice 
and flies in the face of equity from a "clean hands" 
viewpoint. 
From a business analysis, the landlord who fails 
to care for his tenants and allows his rental property to 
fall into a serious state of disrepair has nothing to lose 
but his return on investment. The landlord has simply 
made a bad business investment and must now suffer the 
consequences. To al low such a land lord to recoup his lossEs 
by collecting rent for porviding less than is required 
by law is neither equitable nor just. 
Ultimately, the landlord's economic loss or 
hardship and the losses accruing to tenants and society in 
general overwhelmingly favor the tenant's remedy. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ENTERING 
THE DEFAULT OF APPELLANT 
BASED UPON HIS NON-APPEARANCE 
AT THE PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT 
CONFERENCE. 
By entering the default of Appellant and grantina 
judgment as prayed, the lower court struck his Answer to He 
Complaint. This was done in spite of counsel's representat:· 
that the lawsuit could be effectively defended even in the 
absence of his client. As previously mentioned, the court'' 
ruling implied that the ,Judge did not recognize warranty r; 
habitability as a defense to an eviction action. Sa i,J t ,, 
also seems to indicate a position that the non-appearance 
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of a defendant in a civil proceedinq relieves a Plaintiff 
from presenting a prima facie case and denies any opportunity 
to defend the action. In this matter, counsel was prepared 
to offer documentation and expert testimony as to the condition 
of the premises subject tothe rental agreement. The non-
appearance of his client does not justify the denial of an 
opoortunity to present a defense. 
Case law support of Appellant's position exists. 
In Hiltibrand v. Brown, 134 Colo. 52, 234 P.2d 618 (1951), 
the Plaintiff did not appear in person at trial and the trial 
judge dismissed the action based upon said non-appearance. 
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the dismissal. 
Whether plaintiff could have produced 
sufficient evidence to avert a motion 
for dismissal at the conclusion of her 
case is beside the question, but 
clearly she was entitled to introduce 
whatever evidence was available in 
support of her cause of action, and the 
court erred in denying her that right. 
Id, at 619. 
This holding should apply equally to the presentation of 
a defense to a cause of action, where evidence in support 
of a defense is available. In the present case, it should 
be noted thatnot only was the presentation of a defense 
denied, but also, no opportunity to cross-examine Plaintiffs' 
witnesses was allowed. 
In Coulas v. Sn·ith, 96 Ariz. 125, 395 P.2d 
527 (1964), the Arizona Supreme Court addressed a factual 
situation in which a responsive pleading is filed to a 
l .1.,·c; nit. 
It should therefore be stated that 
once an answer is filed and the case at 
issue, a default judgment is not proper, 
-19-
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and if the defendant fails to appear 
at the trial a judqment on the merits 
may be entered aqainst him upon proper 
proof. Id, at 530. 
The court, in making its rulinq construect its rule of 
civil procedure comparable to Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Its holding, as applied to the present 
case, indicates that it was error not to require a showinc 
of plaintiffs' case, since an answer was filed. In turn, 
had plaintiffs been required to present its case, the defe:.· 
would have had an opportunity to defend. In another case, 
Walker v. Kendig, 107 Ariz. 510, 489 P.2d 849 (1971), 
the Arizona court elaborated on its reluctance to grant 
default judgments. 
Our courts exist for the purpose of 
providing an effective and fair tribunal 
in which parties to a dispute may 
resolve their grievances. An order which 
in effect grants judgment by default 
without regard to the merits of a case 
is a harsh order and justified only 
in circumstances where no reasonable 
excuse is present. Id, at 852. 
The facts and circumstances of the instant case are not 
such as to justify action on a default basis. 
Courts in Utah, and this Court are in agreement 
that, as a matter of general policy, whenever the interest0 
of justice and fair play will be served thereby, the trial 
court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor o'. 
giving the parties an opportunity for a hearing on the mer: 
of a-case. 4 In McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates___c._: 
4
utah Com. Sav. Bank v. Trumbo, 17 U. 198, 53 P. 1033 (13' 
Locke v. Peterson, 3 U.2d 415, 235 P.2d 1111 (1955); Heat'" 
v. Fabian and Clendenin, 14 U.2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1%21: 
Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Ut. 1974) 
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17 U.2d 323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966), this Court explained that 
the "1,urpose of a default judgment is to conclude litigation 
"'1c'n a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend an action"; 
ld, at 130. Such a situation did not exist in the present 
case. 
In Warden v. Lamb, 98 Cal. App. 738, 277 P. 
867 (1929), the District Court of Appeal, Third District 
declined to find authorization for a trial court to enter 
default against the party defendant who had filed an answer, 
regardless of whether defendant appears at trial. 
In case the defendant fails to appear, 
the plaintiff's sole remedy is to move 
the court to proceed with the trial and 
introduce whatever testimony there may 
be to sustain the plaintiff's cause 
of action. Id, at 868. 
Again, Plaintiffs' cause of action in the present case has 
never been presented in court. In U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee 
Co. v. State, 136 Mont. 148, 345 P.2d 734 (1959), the 
Montana Supreme Court found that a responsive pleading 
(in this case a motion for change of venue) constituted 
an appearance, rendering the subsequent default judgment 
improper. 
The authorities on the issue appear to be in 
agreement, and combined with the principles of basic fairness, 
there is no reason to justify the granting of a default 
judgment, and the opoortunity to present a defense. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, argument and law, 
,,~Court is urged to reverse the judgment rendered below, 
-i:1 J remand the case for trial with instructions that a 
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warranty of habitability is implied in residential lease 
agreements, and its breach constitutes a defense to an uni~ 
detainer action based upon non-payment of rent. 
Such a holding would take cognizance of modern 
realities that the basis of the rental agreement is a 
habitable dwelling space, that the modern agreement is both 
a contract and a conveyance, and that a landlord is requir~ 
to maintain dwellings in a habitable condition fit for its 
intended use. A breach of the warranty of habitability 
reduces a tenant's mutually dependent covenant to pay rent 
to the extent of the landlord's breach. Such a holding is 
solidly supported as appropriate implementation of public 
policy. 
It is also urged that this Court find the entry 
of defendant's default and granting of judgment without 
requiring the presentation of evidence, or the opportunity 
for counsel to offer a defense to constitute reversible erw 
Respectfully submitted, 
JO! ATH lJ '!. KI G, Esq• 
~ah Legal Services, Inc. 
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